The literature on networks suggests that the value of a network is positively affected by the number of geographically dispersed locations it serves (the "network effect") and the number of its users (the "production scale effect"). We show that as a result a firm's expected time until adoption of technologies with network effects declines in both users and locations. We provide empirical evidence on the adoption of automated teller machines by banks that is consistent with this prediction. Using standard duration models, we find that a bank's date of adoption is decreasing in the number of its branches (a proxy for the number of locations and hence for the
and Saloner (1985,1986) . 2 Several case studies have been conducted to confirm the relevance of the theories. For example, David (1985) argues that demand-side economies explain the dominance of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard. other banks. In the early days of ATM adoption studied here, interbank networks were quite rare for a variety of technical and institutional reasons. As a result the value of the network to depositors was increasing in the number of The net value of an ATM system to a bank also will be affected by the number of its depositors to whom ATMs are valuable. Because there are fixed costs of adoption, economies of scale in production mean that a bank's propensity to adopt will increase in the number of these depositors. Indeed, earlier studies of ATM adoption by McDowell (1984, 1987) find that bank size, as measured by total assets, is an important determinant of time of adoption. We confirm these results by including a measure of size more directly related to the number of depositors. By including measures of both network size and number of depositors we are able to separate the network effect from the scale economies effect.
Controlling for variation in the number of depositors and other heterogeneity, we find that increasing network size increases the probability of early adoption.
When evaluated at the sample mean, the estimated probability that a bank would have adopted in the first nine years ATMs were available is 17.1 percent. Adding a single branch increases this probability by at least 5.7 percent (to 18.1 percent) and perhaps by as much as 10 percent. In comparison, adding enough depositors to equal an average sized branch increases the adoption probability by 4.3 percent.
The strong network effect is robust to specification and to removing large outliers.
In section 2, we discuss the determinants of ATM adoption and develop a test for network effects. In Section 3 we briefly discuss the statistical models used. The data used to implement these models are discussed in Section 4, and in Section 5 we present our results. Section 6 provides some concluding comments. We begin by considering the "benefit side", and in particular, the benefits to an individual user. In the theoretical literature on network effects, an end-user's per period benefits are frequently represented by a + b(N), where a represents the "stand-alone" benefit from the technology and b(N) represents the network effect. The "stand-alone" or "network independent" component of the user's benefit is that which the user obtains regardless of the size of the network. Thus, a might represent the utility that a depositor receives from having an ATM installed at the branch she David and Olsen (1986) . costs increase in n, the sign of the overall effect of n is, in principle, ambiguous.
with N. To see this recall that C(N,T) = S(T) + Nc(T), so that the right-handside of (2) Alternatively, the benefits of after-hour banking might be greater for some banks, such as those situated in the suburbs, than for others. In this case, among the banks with a given number of depositors and locations, the banks for whom such idiosyncratic benefits are the greatest will adopt earliest while the others wait.
To take account of such differences among banks, let e t -(E(ei) -0) represent the deviation of the per period profits of bank i from the mean profit of banks with the same number of depositors and locations. In this case the net present value of a bank's profit from adopting at time T is:
and Equation (2) becomes:
i.e., banks with idiosyncratically large net benefits adopt early while others wait.
The smallest T ; = T(n, N, e;) that satisfies (3) is the optimal adoption date for the ith bank.
In general the rate of adoption may change over time. This depends on how the cost or benefits of adoption change over time and on how e; is distributed. To see this, use Equation (3) to define:
Then e*(n,N,T) is the e; of the bank with n depositor and N locations that is just indifferent between adopting and not adopting at time T. Then the probability that a bank with n depositors and N locations adopts in period T (i.e., the hazard rate at period T) is:
where H(-) is the cumulative distribution function for e. If, as assumed above, the benefits of adopting relative to costs increase over time, the right-hand-side of equation (4) decreases with T. Therefore even if e is uniformly distributed so that the numerator of (5) McDowell (1984, 1987) 
